

International Political Economy

PSC753 — Fall 2010

Department of Political Science
Syracuse University

Monday 9.30am–12.15pm
Room: Max 315

Professor: Seth Jolly
Contact Information
Office: Eggers 540
Phone: 315.443.2113
Email: skjolly@maxwell.syr.edu
Course website: blackboard.syr.edu

Office Hours
Monday 1–2pm
Wednesday 4–5pm
or by appointment

Course Overview

This seminar explores the interactions between politics and economics in the international system. In the first part of the course, we will explore the theories and approaches in political science that attempt to explain variation in economic exchange and institutions in the international system. In the second half, we will address various issues in international political economy, such as international trade, development, finance, globalization, and regional integration. In these sessions, we will use the theories and analytical tools developed in the first part to critically evaluate the research in these arenas.

In this course, we consider how political institutions and actors deal with the market, and in turn, how the market affects those same institutions and actors. This is not an economics course. However, a certain background knowledge of economic theories, such as the law of comparative advantage, will be helpful. To that end, I listed Krugman and Obstfeld's text in the recommended books section. It is a useful and readable starting point for understanding international economics.

Course Expectations and Requirements

Response Papers

Each student will complete three written critiques of the readings, 6–8 pages (~1500–2000 words) each. Each paper should be distributed to all class members via email by the Sunday morning before class. These response papers will be the starting point for our discussion each week. The authors will also be expected to help lead the discussion during their week. Each student will choose one session from each of the following groups: 2–4, 5–9, and 10–14. To ensure even coverage, we will coordinate response papers during the first session.

I expect the papers to be analytical response papers, not simply restatements of the main arguments. Rather than summaries, you should focus on the strengths and weaknesses of the readings, including addressing any debates between the readings as well as discussing any interesting unanswered research questions raised by the authors. Do not feel obliged to address each article from the week. Rather, you may want to focus on one issue or debate and follow it through several pieces. The supplementary readings provide additional resources for this purpose and you are welcome to incorporate them. For these readings, though, be aware your classmates will not have read them so a little more summarizing may be in order.

Discussant

Each student will choose one article from the main readings to discuss. The discussant will present the paper, key findings, and some criticism to jump-start the discussion. Beyond presenting and summarizing the paper itself, discussants should provide comments and criticisms similar to the Political Science Research Workshop format. Comments should be between 10–20 minutes.

Book Review

In addition, students will write one book review on a work in the Supplementary Readings, 800–1200 words. You may propose a book not on the syllabus that is pertinent to the topics of a class section, but each book may be reviewed only once. Similar to the response papers, the better reviews will not simply describe the main argument but focus on evaluating the theory and empirics. Issues to address include: central question(s) and its relevance in the scholarly literature and/or the policy world, the clarity and validity of the theory, and the quality of the key evidence. Book reviews are to be circulated to students and the instructor no later than 24 hours before the appropriate class session, i.e., by Sunday morning. Book reviews will be distributed on a first-come first-serve basis, so notify me when you select a book.

Participation

As a graduate seminar, each participant will be expected to attend class and be prepared to discuss the assigned readings. Active student participation is essential to a successful seminar.

Evaluation

Response Papers (3)	60%
Book Review	15%
Discussant	10%
Participation	15%

Readings

All books will be available for purchase from the Syracuse University bookstore, and will be placed on reserve at the library. Other readings will be available on-line in blackboard.

Required Books

Gilpin, Robert. 2001. *Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (ISBN: 069108677X)

Hiscox, Michael. 2002. *International Trade and Political Conflict: Commerce, Coalitions and Factor Mobility*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (ISBN: 0691088551)

Keohane, Robert. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (ISBN: 0691122482)

Nelsen, Brent F. and Alexander Stubb, eds. 2003. *The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration*. 3rd edition. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. (ISBN: 1588262316)

Vreeland, James. 2003. *The IMF and Economic Growth*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (ISBN: 0521016959)

Recommended Books

Krugman, Paul and Maurice Obstfeld. 2005. *International Economics: Theory and Policy*. 7th ed. Boston: Addison-Wesley. (ISBN: 0321293835)

Course Policies

Statement Regarding Disability-Related Accommodations

Students who are in need of disability-related academic accommodations must register with the Office of Disability Services (ODS), 804 University Avenue, Room 309, 315-443-4498. Students with authorized disability-related accommodations should provide a current Accommodation Authorization Letter from ODS to the instructor and review those accommodations with the instructor. Accommodations, such as exam administration, are not provided retroactively; therefore, planning for accommodations as early as possible is necessary. For further information, see the ODS website, Office of Disability Services <http://disabilityservices.syr.edu>.

Academic Integrity Statement

The Syracuse University Academic Integrity Policy holds students accountable for the integrity of the work they submit. Students should be familiar with the Policy and know that it is their responsibility to learn about instructor and general academic expectations with regard to proper citation of sources in written work. The policy also governs the integrity of work submitted in exams and assignments as well as the veracity of signatures on attendance sheets and other verifications of participation in class activities. Serious sanctions can result from academic dishonesty of any sort. For more information and the complete policy, see <http://academicintegrity.syr.edu>

Class Schedule

I. Theoretical Approaches

Session 1: Overview of IPE and Political Science Methods (30 August)

Required Readings

Gilpin, *Global Political Economy*:

- Ch. 1 “The New Global Economic Order”: 3–24
- Ch. 4 “The Study of International Political Economy”: 77–102
- Ch. 5 “New Economic Theories”: 103–128
- *Recommended, but optional*: Ch. 3 “The Neoclassical Conception of the Economy”: 46–76

Keohane, Robert O. 2009. “The Old IPE and the New.” *Review of International Political Economy* 16.1 (February): 34–46.

King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Chapter 1, p. 3–33 [Blackboard].

Lipson, Charles. 1984. “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs.” *World Politics* 37.1 (October): 1–23.

Supplementary Readings

Eichengreen, Barry. 1998. “Dental Hygiene and Nuclear War: How International Relations Looks From Economics.” *International Organization* 52.4 (Autumn): 993–1012.

Frieden, Jeffrey and Lisa Martin. 2003. “International Political Economy: Global and Domestic Interactions.” In *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, eds. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner. New York: W.W. Norton, 118–146 [Blackboard].

Gourevitch, Peter. 1978. “The Second Image Reversed: International Influences on Domestic Politics.” *International Organization* 32.4 (Autumn): 881–912.

Mastanduno, Michael. 1999. “Economics and Security in Statecraft and Scholarship.” *International Organization* 52.4 (Autumn): 825–854.

Mittelman, James H. 2002. “Globalization: An Ascendant Paradigm?” *International Studies Perspectives* 3.1 (February): 1–14.

van Evera, Stephen. 1997. *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Chapter 1.

No Class—Labor Day

Session 2: State Power (13 September)

Required Readings

- Drezner, Daniel W. 2003. "The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion." *International Organization* 57.3 (July): 643–659.
- Hurd, Ian. 1999. "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics." *International Organization* 53.2 (Spring): 379–408.
- Krasner, Stephen D. 1991. "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier." *World Politics* 43.3 (April): 336–366.
- March, James and Johan Olsen. 1998. "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders." *International Organization* 52.4 (October): 943–969.
- Nye, Joseph. 1990. "Soft Power." *Foreign Policy* 80 (Autumn): 153–171.
- Pape, Robert A. 1997. "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work." *International Security* 22.2 (Autumn): 90–110.
- Wohlforth, William. 1999. "The Stability of a Unipolar World." *International Security* 24.1 (Summer): 5–41.

Supplementary Readings

- Drezner, Daniel. 1999. *The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Drezner, Daniel. 2007. *All Politics is Global*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Elliott, Kimberly Ann. 1998. "The Sanctions Glass. Half Full or Completely Empty?" *International Security* 23.1 (Summer): 50–65.
- Gruber, Lloyd. 2000. *Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kahler, Miles. 2002. "The State of the State in World Politics." In *Political Science: State of the Discipline* eds. Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Keeley, James. 1990. "Toward a Foucauldian Analysis of International Regimes." *International Organization* 44.1 (Winter): 83–105.
- Keohane, Robert O. 1997. "Problematic Lucidity: Stephen Krasners 'State Power and the Structure of International Trade.'" *World Politics* 50.1 (October): 150–170.
- Kirshner, Jonathan. 1995. *Currency and Coercion: The Political Economy of International Monetary Power*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Martin, Lisa L. 1992. *Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mansfield, Edward. 1992. "The Concentration of Capabilities and International Trade." *International Organization* 46 .3 (Summer): 731–764.
- Pape, Robert A. 1998. "Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work." *International Security* 23.1 (Summer): 66–77.
- Viner, Jacob. 1948. "Power Versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," *World Politics* 1.1 (October): 1–29.

Session 3: Cooperation in the International Economy (20 September)

Required Readings

- Gintis, Herbert. 2000. *Game Theory Evolving*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, Ch. 1 [Blackboard].
- Grieco, Joseph. 1988. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism." *International Organization* 42.3 (Summer): 485–507.
- Keohane, *After Hegemony*, Chs. 1–7, p. 5–134.
- Mastanduno, Michael. 1991. "Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy." *International Security* 16.1 (Summer): 73–113.
- Oye, Kenneth. 1985. "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies." *World Politics* 38.1 (October): 1–24.
- Putnam, Robert. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games." *International Organization* 42.3 (Summer): 427–460.

Supplementary Readings

- Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal. 1998. "Why States Act through Formal International Organizations." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42.1 (February): 3–32.
- Akerlof, George. 1970. "The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 84.3 (August): 488–500.
- Cowhey, Peter. 1993. "Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International Commitments: Japan and the United States." *International Organization* 47.2 (Spring): 299–326.
- Drezner, Daniel, ed. 2003. *Locating the Proper Authorities: The Interaction of Domestic Politics and International Institutions*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Goldstein, Judith, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane and Anne-Marie Slaughter. 2000. "Introduction: Legalization and World Politics." *International Organization* 54.3 (Summer): 385–400.
- Haggard, Stephan and Beth A. Simmons. 1987. "Theories of International Regimes." *International Organization* 41.3 (Summer): 491–517.
- Keohane, *After Hegemony*, Chs. 8–11.
- Keohane, Robert O. 1982. "The Demand for International Regimes." *International Organization* 36.2 (Spring): 325–355.
- Keohane, Robert O. 1988. "International Institutions: Two Approaches." *International Studies Quarterly* 32.4 (December): 379–396.
- Keohane, Robert O. 1993. "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War." In *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: Contemporary Debate*, ed. David Baldwin. Columbia: Columbia UP, 269–300.
- Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, eds. 2004. *The Rational Design of International Institutions*. New York: Cambridge UP. *Previously published as a special issue of International Organization* 55.4 (Autumn 2001).
- Legro, Jeffrey W. and Andrew Moravcsik. 1999. "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" *International Security* 24.2 (Autumn): 5–55.
- March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen. 1984. "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political

- Life." *American Political Science Review* 78.3 (September): 734–749.
- Martin, Lisa L. and Beth Simmons. 1999. "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions." *International Organization* 52.4 (Autumn): 729–757.
- Martin, Lisa L. 2000. *Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 1994–1995. "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security* 19.3 (Winter): 5–49.
- Keohane, Robert O. and Lisa L. Martin. 1995. "The Promise of Institutional Theory." *International Security* 20.1 (Summer): 39–51.
 - Mearsheimer, John J. 1995. "A Realist Reply." *International Security* 20.1 (Summer): 82–93.
- Milner, Helen. 1997. *Interests, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Milner, Helen V. 1999. "Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis Among International, American and Comparative Politics." *International Organization* 52.4 (Autumn): 759–786.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics." *International Organization* 51.4 (Autumn): 513–553.
- Olson Jr., Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Russett, Bruce. 1985. "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, is Mark Twain Really Dead?" *International Organization* 39 (Spring): 207–231.

More on the Relative Gains Debate

- Grieco, Joseph, Robert Powell, and Duncan Snidal. 1993. "The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation." *American Political Science Review* 87.3 (September): 727–743.
- Powell, Robert. 1991. "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory." *American Political Science Review* 85.4 (December): 1303–1320.
- Simmons, Beth A. and Daniel Hopkins. 2005. "The Constraining Power of International Treaties: Theories and Methods." *American Political Science Review* 99: 623–631.
- Snidal, Duncan. 1991. "International Cooperation Among Relative Gains Maximizers." *International Studies Quarterly* 35: 387–402.
- Snidal, Duncan. 1991. "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation." *American Political Science Review* 85.3 (September): 701–726.

II. Issue Areas

Session 4: International Trade: International Influences, Part 1 (27 September)

Required Readings

Gilpin, *Global Political Economy*, Ch. 8, p. 196–233.

Keohane, *After Hegemony*, Chs. 8–11, p. 135–259.

Krasner, Stephen. 1976. “State Power and the Structure of International Trade.” *World Politics* 28.3 (April): 317–347.

Snidal, Duncan. 1985. “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory.” *International Organization* 39.4 (Autumn): 579–614.

* *See Session 5 for Supplementary readings*

Session 5: International Trade: International Influences, Part 2 (4 October)

Required Readings

Goldstein, Judith and Lisa L. Martin. 2000. “Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note.” *International Organization* 54.3 (Summer): 603–632.

Goldstein, Judith, Douglas Rivers and Michael Tomz. 2007. “Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade.” *International Organization* 61.1: 37–67.

Kim, Moonhawk. 2008. “Costly Procedures: Divergent Effects of Legalization in the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures.” *International Studies Quarterly* 52.3: 657–686.

Mansfield, Edward. 1992. “The Concentration of Capabilities and International Trade.” *International Organization* 46 (Summer):731–764.

Martin, Philippe, Thierry Mayer and Mathias Thoenig. 2008. “Make Trade Not War?” *Review of Economic Studies* 75.3: 865–900.

Rose, Andrew 2004. “Do WTO Members Have More Liberal Trade Policy?” *Journal of International Economics* 63: 209–235.

Supplementary Readings

Gowa, Joanne. 1995. *Allies, Adversaries and International Trade*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Irwin, Douglas. 1997. *Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kindleberger, Charles. 1974. *The World in Depression, 1929–1939*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lipson, Charles. 1982. “The Transformation of Trade: The Sources and Effects of Regime Changes.” *International Organization* 36.2 (Spring): 417–455.

McKeown, Timothy. 1983. “Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19th Century Tariff Levels.” *International Organization*. 37.1 (Winter): 73–91.

- Rose, Andrew. 2002. "Do WTO Members Have a More Liberal Trade Policy?" NBER Working Paper 9347. (<http://papers.nber.org/papers/w9347>).
- Rose, Andrew. 2004. "Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade" *The American Economic Review* 94.1 (March): 98–114.
- Ruggie, John Gerard. 1982. "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order." *International Organization* 36.2 (Spring): 379–415.
- Smith, James McCall. 2000. "The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts." *International Organization* 54.1 (Winter): 137–180.
- Stein, Arthur. 1984. "The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order." *International Organization* 38.2 (Spring): 355–386.

Session 6: International Trade: Domestic Influences, Part 1 (11 October)

Required Readings

Davis, Christina L. 2004. "International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization." *American Political Science Review* 98.1 (February): 153–169.

Gawande, Kishore and Bernard Hoekman. 2006. "Lobbying and Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States." *International Organization* 60.3: 527–561.

Hiscox, *International Trade and Political Conflict*:

- Chs. 1–4, p. 3–70.
- Ch. 7, p. 96–103.
- Chs. 10–11, p. 128–164.

Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. "Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade." *American Political Science Review* 81.4 (December): 1121–1137.

Scheve, Kenneth and Matthew Slaughter. 2001. "What Determines Individual Trade Policy Preferences?" *Journal of International Economics* 54.2: 267–292.

* See Session 7 for Supplementary readings

Session 7: International Trade: Domestic Influences, Part 2 (18 October)

Required Readings

Frye, Timothy and Edward Mansfield. 2004. "Timing is Everything: Elections and Trade Liberalization in the Post-Communist World." *Comparative Political Studies* 37.4 (May): 371–398.

Goldstein, Judith. 1988. "Ideas, Institutions, and American Trade Policy" *International Organization* 42.1 (Winter): 179–217.

Henisz, Witold and Edward Mansfield. 2006. "Votes and Vetoes: The Political Determinants of Commercial Openness." *International Studies Quarterly* 50.1: 189–211.

Kono, Daniel Y. 2006. "Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency." *American Political Science Review* 100.3 (August): 369–384.

López-Córdova, J. Ernesto and Christopher M. Meissner. 2008. "The Impact of International Trade on Democracy: A Long Run Perspective." *World Politics* 60.4: 539–575.

Milner, Helen and Keiko Kubota. 2005. "Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries." *International Organization* 59.1 (Winter): 107–143.

Supplementary Readings

Davis, Christina L. 2003. *Food Fights Over Free Trade: How International Institutions Promote Agricultural Trade Liberalization*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Frieden, Jeff. 1988. "Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914–1940." *International Organization* 42.1 (Winter): 59–90.

Goldstein, Judith. 1989. "The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy: The Origins of U.S. Agricultural and Manufacturing Policies." *International Organization* 43.1 (Winter): 31–71.

Gourevitch, Peter. 1986. *Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises*.

- Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. "Protection for Sale." *American Economic Review* 84.4 (September): 833-850.
- Hiscox, Michael. 2001. "Class Versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and The Politics of Trade." *International Organization* 55.1 (Winter): 1-46.
- Kono, Daniel Yuichi. 2008. "Democracy and Trade Discrimination." *Journal of Politics* 70.4: 942-955.
- Kurth, James R. 1979. "The Political Consequences of the Product Cycle: Industrial History and Political Outcomes." *International Organization* 33.1 (Winter): 1-34.
- Lohmann, Susan and Sharyn OHalloran. 1994. "Divided Government and US Trade Policy." *International Organization* 48.4 (Autumn): 595-632.
- Mansfield, Edward D. and Mark L. Busch. 1995. "The Political Economy of Non-Tariff Barriers: A Cross-National Analysis." *International Organization* 49.4 (Autumn): 723-749.
- Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2000. "Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade." *American Political Science Review* 94.2 (June): 305-321.
- McCallum, John. 1995. "National Borders Matter: Canada-U.S. Regional Trade Patterns." *American Economic Review* 85.3 (June): 615-623.
- McGillivray, Fiona. 2004. *Privileging Industry: The Comparative Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Milner, Helen. 1988. *Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rogowski, Ronald. 1989. *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. "Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions." *International Organization* 41.2 (Spring): 203-223.
- Schoppa, Leonard. 1993. "Two-level Games and Bargaining Outcomes: Why Gaiatsu Succeeds in Japan in Some Cases But Not Others." *International Organization* 47.3 (Summer): 353-386.
- Thies, Cameron and Schulyer Porche. 2007. "The Political Economy of Agricultural Protection." *Journal of Politics* 69.1: 116-127.
- Tomz, Michael. 2007. "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach." *International Organization* 61.4 (Fall): 821-840.

Session 8: Foreign Direct Investment & Multinational Production (25 October)

Required Readings

- Gilpin, *Global Political Economy*, Ch. 11, p. 278–304.
- Büthe, Tim and Helen V. Milner. 2008. “The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements?” *American Journal of Political Science* 52.4: 741–762.
- Evans, Peter. 1971. “National Autonomy and Economic Development: Critical Perspectives on Multinational Corporations in Poor Countries.” *International Organization* 25.3 (Summer): 675–692.
- Jensen, Nathan and Guillermo Rosas. 2007. “Foreign Direct Investment and Income Inequality in Mexico, 1990–2000.” *International Organization* 61.3: 467–487.
- Jensen, Nathan. 2003. “Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment.” *International Organization* 57.3 (July): 587–616.
- Kobrin, Stephen. 1987. “Testing the Bargaining Hypothesis in the Manufacturing Sector in Developing Countries.” *International Organization* 41.4 (Autumn): 609–638.
- Malesky, Edmund J. 2008. “Straight Ahead on Red: How Foreign Direct Investment Empowers Subnational Leaders.” *Journal of Politics* 70.1: 97–119.
- Scheve, Kenneth and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2004. “Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production.” *American Journal of Political Science* 48.4 (October): 662–674.

Supplementary Readings

- Biglaiser, Glen and Karl DeRouen Jr. 2007. “Following the Flag: Troop Deployment and U.S. Foreign Direct Investment.” *International Studies Quarterly* 51.4: 835–854.
- Elkins, Zachary et al. 2006. “Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000.” *International Organization* 60.4: 811–846.
- Evans, Peter. 1979. *Dependent Development: The Alliance of multinational, State and Local Capital in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Gereffi, Gary, John Humphrey and Timothy Sturgeon. 2005. “The Governance of Global Value Chains.” *Review of International Political Economy* 12.1 (February): 78–104.
- Helpman, Elhanan. 2006. “Trade, FDI and the Organization of Firms.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 44 (September): 589–630.
- Jensen, Nathan. 2006. *Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation: A Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Jensen, Nathan. 2008. “Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment.” *Journal of Politics* 70.4: 1040–1052.
- Li, Quan. 2006. “Democracy, Autocracy, and Tax Incentives to Foreign Direct Investors: A Cross-National Analysis.” *Journal of Politics* 68 (February): 62–74.
- Li, Quan and Adam Resnick. 2003. “Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries.” *International Organization* 57.1 (January): 175–211.
- Malesky, Edmund J. 2006. “Re-Thinking the Obsolescing Bargain: Do Foreign Investors Really Surrender their Influence over Economic Reform in Transition States?” Manuscript.

- Moran, Theodore H. 1974. *Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Moran, Theodore H. 2002. *Beyond Sweatshops: Foreign Direct Investment and Globalization in Developing Countries*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press.
- Mosley, Layna and Saika Uno. 2007. "Racing to the Bottom or Climbing to the Top? Economic Globalization and Collective Labor Rights." *Comparative Political Studies* 40.8: 923–944.
- Vernon, Raymond. 1966. "International trade and international investment in the product cycle." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 80: 190–207.

Session 9: Economic Development and Economic Growth (1 November)

Required Readings

- Gilpin, *Global Political Economy*, Ch. 12, p. 305–340.
- Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2006. “Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective.” *American Political Science Review* 100 (February): 115–131.
- Easterly, William. 2003. “Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17.3: 23–48.
- Haggard, Stephan. 1990. *Pathways from the Periphery*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Chs. 1, 2 and 10.
- Hanson, Jonathan. 2009. “Growth Paradigms and Congruent Institutions: Estimating Context-Varying Effects of Political Institutions on Economic Performance.” manuscript.
- Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World. 1950–1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Ch. 3 “Political Regimes and Economic Growth.”

Supplementary Readings

- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James Robinson. 2002. “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation.” *American Economic Review* 91.5: 1369–1401.
- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James Robinson. 2002. “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117.4: 1231–1294.
- Barro, Robert. 1997. *Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Study*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Baum, Matthew A. and David A. Lake. 2003. “The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital.” *American Journal of Political Science* 47.2: 333–347.
- Devlin, Robert. 1989. *Debt and Crisis in Latin America: The Supply Side of the Story*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Easterly, William. 2001. *The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Frieden, Jeffrey A. 1991. *Debt, Development and Democracy: Modern Political Economy and Latin America, 1965–1985*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Gerschenkron, Alexander. 1962. *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard.
- Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World*.
- Rodrik, Dani. 2007. *One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rudra, Nita. 2008. *Globalization and the Race to the Bottom in Developing Countries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, Tony. 1979. “The Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of Dependency Theory.” *World Politics* 31.2 (January): 247–288.
- “Symposium on Growth in Africa.” 1999. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 13.3 (Summer). Esp. articles by Paul Collier and Jan Willem Gunning (Why Has Africa Grown Slowly?) and Benno J. Ndulu and Stephen A. O’Connell (Governance and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa).

Session 10: The IMF & Developing Nations (8 November)

- Stone, Randall. 2004. "The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa." *American Political Science Review* 98 (November): 577–591.
- Stone, Randall. 2008. "The Scope of IMF Conditionality." *International Organization* 62.4: 589–620.
- Thacker, Strom C. 1999. "The High Politics of IMF Lending." *World Politics* 52.1 (October): 38–75.
- Vreeland, *The IMF and Economic Growth*.

Supplementary Readings

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Session 11: International Finance and Monetary Politics (15 November)

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Session 12: Regional Economic Integration (22 November)

Required Readings

Gilpin, *Global Political Economy*, Ch. 13, p. 341–361.

Nelsen & Stubb, *The European Union*:

- Part 1: Churchill, Schuman, Monnet, de Gaulle, Thatcher, Delors, Fischer, Chirac, and Blair.
- David Mitrany, Ch. 14 “A Working Peace System”: 99–119.
- Ernst Haas, Ch. 16 “The Uniting of Europe”: 145–149.
- Stanley Hoffman, Ch. 18 “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe”: 163–177.
- Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholtz, Ch. 21 “Integration, Supranational Governance, and the Institutionalization of the European Polity”: 215–238.
- Andrew Moravcsik, Ch. 22 “The Choice for Europe”: 239–253.
- Mark A. Pollack, Ch. 23 “Delegation and Agency in the European Community”: 255–279.
- Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, Ch. 28 “Multi-Level Governance in the European Union”: 281–311.

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- Stephan Haggard, Ch. 2 “Regionalism in Asia and the Americas”: 20–49.
- Helen V. Milner, Ch. 4 “Industries, Governments, and the Creation of Regional Trade Blocs”: 77–106.
- Pier Carlo Padoan, Ch. 5 “Regional Agreements as Clubs: The European Case”: 107–133.
- Joseph M. Grieco, Ch. 7 “Systemic Sources of Variation in Regional Institutionalization in Western Europe, East Asia, and the Americas”: 164–187.

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- Karl Deutsch et al., Ch. 15 “Political Community and the North Atlantic Area”: 121–143
- Bela Balassa, Ch. 19 “The Theory of Economic Integration”: 179–191

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Session 13: Globalization, Part 1: The Causes of Liberalization (29 November)

Required Readings

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* See Session 14 for Supplementary readings

Session 14: Globalization, Part 2: The Effects of Liberalization (6 December)

Required Readings

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